An unexpected connection on LinkedIn. A proposal of employment from a headhunter, probably a young woman, operating from the Asian nation. The chance to earn around £20,000 part-time preparing a handful of geopolitical reports for a Chinese company containing “non-public” or privileged information. Compensation in digital currency or physical money preferred.
It may seem clear, on this telling, that an element about this approach would be suspicious. Nevertheless, China’s powerful intelligence agency still considers it worthwhile to use headhunters to try it – prompting the domestic spy agency to issue multiple warnings about their operations online.
Massive Approaches on Social Media
Last year, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum said operatives from China were contacting UK citizens on LinkedIn on an unprecedented level, at a rate of ten thousand over the preceding two and a half years, seeking political, commercial, defense and technological classified information. However a new initiative aimed at elected officials and Westminster has prompted the spy agency to take further action.
A spying warning was distributed on this week via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his House of Lords counterpart: a brief presentation after the repeated efforts of certain individuals and other operatives to reach out to MPs, lords, their assistants, economic experts, thinktanks – anybody who might become a source.
Intelligence Strategy and Legislative Updates
In the typical style of British intelligence, there was no publication of the protective guidance from the agency or the interior ministry. But the agency was aware its advisory document would leak once it was emailed out to Westminster. Republishing it in the media helps the wider public more easily recognize interactions with a fraudulent purpose.
The alert has the impact of flushing out more information from in and around Westminster, though that is not MI5’s main objective. The agency wants public figures to recognize that simply because interactions on professional networks are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.
Nor is internal security service believed to have been reacting to any specific incident in the legislature, though the recent actions occur after the embarrassing collapse of the legal case of a former parliamentary aide an individual and his friend another person on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been accused of working for China – a allegation they denied – but failure to successfully conclude a prosecution under the now repealed Official Secrets Act led to concerns that British democracy had been left unprotected.
Updated Legislation and China's Strategic Goals
Legislation has since been updated, and the security briefing contains a reminder of its replacement: “Those engaging in espionage activity risk substantial criminal penalties under the new security law.” It is a criminal offense if a person participates in conduct that could potentially “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious question, however, is what Beijing has to gain. A politician who is not a government minister will have limited access of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs less so. Yet Beijing is also interested in parliament: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s approach to China on matters such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or genocide was being influenced by MPs.
Cultural Variations and Ongoing Digital Risks
In part there are cultural differences too. Autocratic regimes like China’s export information gathering methods and the scale of its spy network is enormous, engaging three hundred thousand individuals. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, commented it was occasionally assessed that “China have greater linguistic capacity involved in this than we [western intelligence] have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is willing to cultivate contacts over the extended period and sometimes even the intelligence services have found it difficult to differentiate legitimate relationships and espionage. “China has a minimal requirement for what information is deemed to be of value,” security minister Dan Jarvis informed MPs on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the government situation may mean someone quickly marginal becomes important.
Another way to consider the relentless efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between Beijing and the Western nations at a threshold below the level of direct conflict. The nation has increased its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon infiltration of communications systems in numerous nations, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of countless connected equipment.
Chinese authorities is involved in persistent attempts to identify secret informants on UK politics via digital means because it wants to be challenging, to display influence and because it has the capability.
